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ARTICLE
KEEPERS OF THE NEW COVENANT:
THE PURITAN LEGACY IN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
DANIEL F. PIARt
INTRODUCTION
There is an emerging tendency in legal scholarship to study
law as a cultural artifact. Rather than arguing about what the
law says, how it should be reformed, or how it can best effect
policy, scholars are beginning to study how cultures use law, how
cultural factors influence the development of law, and how
changes in culture yield changes in law quite apart from
questions of law reform or doctrinal description.' While this
cultural perspective can illuminate our legal past, it can also
yield surprising conclusions about the current directions of law
and culture.
This Article offers one such perspective by linking the
current culture of civil rights law to the American Puritan
culture of the seventeenth century. At first glance these two
cultures would seem to have virtually nothing in common: The
Puritans are commonly viewed as dour theocrats presiding over a
repressive, witch-burning regime, while the modern age of civil
rights is seen as one of expanding personal liberties free from the
complications of state-sponsored religion. But beneath the
stereotypes lie important cultural similarities, among them the
view of the proper role of law. As I will explain, both the Puritan
I J.D., Yale Law School; A.B., Harvard University, English and American
Language and Literature; Professor and Associate Dean for Scholarship, John
Marshall Law School, Atlanta. Thanks to Diona Potter and Michael Bauer for their
able research assistance; thanks also to Morteza Parvin of the John Marshall Law
Library for his vital help in obtaining research materials.
' See, e.g., PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 1-6 (1999); CULTURAL ANALYSIS, CULTURAL STUDIES, AND THE
LAW: MOVING BEYOND LEGAL REALISM 4 (Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon eds.,
2003).
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culture and our own share a belief that one of law's functions is
to define and enforce the proper conditions for the development of
the individual soul.
In our own time, this link is reflected in a series of landmark
Supreme Court cases in which constitutional rights have been
construed with an eye toward protecting what the Court has
called "the sphere of intellect and spirit";2 or "the right to define
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life";' or the "transcendent dimensions" of
personal freedom-in short, the soul.4  As early as 1943, the
Court identified a "right of self-determination in matters that
touch individual opinion and personal attitude" and forbade
government to trespass on "the sphere of intellect and spirit."5 A
decade later, the Court struck down school segregation on the
grounds that it "generates a feeling of inferiority" detrimental to
minority schoolchildren. More recently, the Court has developed
a test for Establishment Clause cases that bars government
action that makes people feel like "outsiders, not full members of
the political community."' It has struck down school prayer that
causes nonbelieving students to feel "offense," "isolation," and
"affront." It has disallowed state action that it sees as
interfering with "the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life."9 And it has emphasized that legally protected
liberty must be understood not only in the "spatial" dimensions of
bodily freedom, but also in the "more transcendent dimensions"
of spiritual autonomy. 0 Thus, constitutional law has taken as a
primary subject what legal historian James Willard Hurst called
"the personal environment," or what we might now call the self,
the psyche, or the soul."
2 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
3 Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
4 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
' W. Va. State Bd. of Educ., 319 U.S. at 631, 642.
6 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
' Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 594 (1992).
9 Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
10 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
nSee JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAw AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 85 (1956).
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This yoking of law to the spiritual finds cultural precedent in
the Puritan regime of the seventeenth century. In Puritan
America, church and state were bent to the service of a well-
defined process of individual salvation, guarded by secular
power, and enforceable by civil punishments. The Puritans held
a view of society, the individual, and the role of law that had,
roughly, the following four components: (1) the central question
of life is whether the individual soul has achieved salvation;
(2) the individual is too weak and corrupt to develop spiritually
on his own; (3) the achievement of salvation requires the
mediation of the Word of God through the organized church; and
(4) civil government exists to support the church and to maintain
the proper conditions for individual souls to flourish. Human
authority, therefore, was indispensable to the process of
salvation. The soul was the supreme object of the divine scheme,
but the soul needed a particular kind of help, and that help was
enforceable by law. As one recent commentator has noted,
"[almong the fundamentals of Puritan jurisprudence were the
integrated and determined use of legal and ecclesiastical
institutions to foster a godly community."12 Law for them, as for
us, was directed toward the flourishing of the soul.
The recognition of the cultural links between the Puritans
and ourselves has several implications. First, it undermines the
claim that modern constitutional law is wholly secular. While
the Court has been seen, and has seen itself, as a bulwark
against the mingling of government and religion, this view
ignores the extent to which the law itself functions as a religion.
For what is religion if not a program of concern with the soul?
By viewing the spiritual as part of law's empire, the Court, with
the apparent blessing of the culture, has placed itself in a
position of transcendent authority, just as the Puritan fathers did
and, indeed, as virtually any religious leader does. We have, in
short, a constitutional religion to replace the old theistic one.
This realization also adds another dimension to the growing
body of scholarship on the religious aspects of constitutional law.
To date, scholars drawing connections between constitutional law
and religion have largely focused on hermeneutics, such as
drawing links between methods of Biblical and constitutional
12 Richard J. Ross, The Career of Puritan Jurisprudence, 26 LAw & HiST. REV.
227, 227-28 (2008).
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interpretation, symbolism as practiced in church and state, and
identifying the remaining strains of theistic "civil religion" in
constitutional law.1 3 This Article takes the discussion in a
slightly different direction by treating law as religion, as opposed
to showing the parallels between law and religion. While this
subject has been broached by other scholars, 4 it has not to my
knowledge been treated as a matter of cultural inheritance, as I
propose to do here.
Finally, the religious function of law raises important
questions about the current state of our constitutional culture.
Specifically, if it functions as a religion, is it a religion of
liberation or a religion of oppression? For the Puritans, the role
of law was to enforce the earthly conditions for eternal salvation,
but in the process they were at times dogmatic, intolerant, and
repressive. The individual, seen as inherently weak and sinful,
needed the ministrations of church and state to achieve
transcendent ends, and when rebels such as Anne Hutchinson
tried to go it alone, they were censured and banished. Likewise,
modern constitutionalism seeks individual freedom in its
tendency to enforce claims of individual right. But we may
wonder whether this proceeds from assumptions about the
weakness of human nature and the consequent need for a central
authority to set the proper course. There is a real danger that
modern constitutional law, like the American Puritan regime,
exalts the individual while subjecting him to profound legal
control. Whether for good or ill-and I think it is some of
both-we have given law a central place in our innermost lives.
At the least, we should make this choice consciously and not as
the unwitting children of our cultural milieu.
I will begin this Article by showing the extent to which the
modern Supreme Court has used rights law to claim a role as the
overseer of the spiritual realm, then connect this trend to its
cultural predecessor, the American Puritan regime. I will
conclude with some thoughts as to the implications of this
cultural kinship for our freedoms and our selves.
1 See generally SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988); Thomas C.
Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984); Steven D. Smith,
Idolatry in Constitutional Interpretation, in AGAINST THE LAW 157 (Paul F. Campos
et al. eds., 1996).
14 See generally W. Tarver Rountree, Jr., Constitutionalism as the American
Religion: The Good Portion, 39 EMORY L.J. 203 (1990); Pierre Schlag, Law as the
Continuation of God by Other Means, 85 CAL. L. REV. 427 (1997).
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II. THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL RELIGION
The internal or spiritual use of constitutional law is in most
respects a twentieth century innovation. Indeed, such an
approach would have been foreign to the law in the first century
or so of American constitutionalism. Through much of the
nineteenth century, the courts were distinctly unwilling to
engage in the business of soothing spirits or guiding souls. In
fact, they tended to dismiss claims of spiritual freedom as merely
personal problems rather than legal ones. In the state courts,
individual claims based on liberty of conscience, such as the right
to exemptions from Sunday laws, the right not to be forced to
pray in public schools, and the right to be free from prosecutions
for blasphemy, were typically rejected on the theory that the
outward duties imposed by law did not interfere with the
individual's inward power to believe as he wished.1" It is true
that conscience was kept free from state interference, typically by
express constitutional provisions. At the same time, however,
the courts would not allow claims of conscience to trump state
action.'" Meanwhile, in landmark cases such as Scott v.
Sandford," The Civil Rights Cases,' Plessy v. Ferguson,'9 and
Reynolds v. United States,20 the U.S. Supreme Court showed
itself to be uninterested in legal claims founded on personal
dignity, spiritual freedom, or other such internal claims.
This approach to law was in large part an outgrowth of a
liberal Protestant culture-not to be confused with Puritan
Calvinism-which heavily influenced nineteenth century law and
which believed in individual moral autonomy rather than state
moral intervention.2 ' But with the late-century decline of
Protestantism as a means of public discourse, the stage was set
for law to move toward regulation of the internal realm,
colonizing territory that had previously been occupied by a
religion.22 This progression was noted by legal historian James
15 See Daniel F. Piar, Majority Rights, Minority Freedoms: Protestant Culture,
Personal Autonomy, and Civil Liberties in Nineteenth-Century America, 14 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 987, 988-89 (2006).
16 See generally id.
17 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
18 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
' 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
21 See Piar, supra note 15, at 987-88.
22 See id. at 1022.
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Willard Hurst in his seminal Law and the Conditions of Freedom
in the Nineteenth-Century United States.2 3 Hurst described
three environments that the nineteenth century progressively
subjected to legal regulation.2 4 The "natural environment" was
the first, responding to the needs of westward movement and the
expropriation of natural resources.25 The "social environment"
was the second, law serving here to govern group interactions
and structure expanding communities.2 6 "Subtlest and the last to
be envisaged as presenting a challenge was the individual's
internal environment, formed by the pattern of deepset emotional
drives and the values resting thereon. ... "27 Thus, following the
Civil War, "we began to use law with growing consciousness of a
need to meet the challenge of the personal environment, set by
individuals' emotional response to circumstance."28 The end
result was "more self-conscious resort to law as the expression of
values."29 Hurst, of course, was writing about the nineteenth
century and so did not apply these insights to twentieth century
civil rights law. Nonetheless, that is precisely where this shift
led. Empowered by the Fourteenth Amendment and buoyed by
the culture's growing interest in the internal states of
individuals, the Supreme Court began to turn inward, evaluating
civil rights claims with reference to the emotional, spiritual, or
psychic impact of state action on those affected. 0 The Court that
began the twentieth century talking about the right of the
individual to sell his labor" ended the century talking about "the
right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
23 See HURST, supra note 11, at 84-85.
24 See id. at 39.
25 See id.
26 See id.
27 Id.
2 Id. at 85.
29 Id.
so See generally Daniel F. Piar, A Welfare State of Civil Rights: The Triumph of
the Therapeutic in American Constitutional Law, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 649
(2008). See JOHN E. SEMONCHE, CHARTING THE FUTURE: THE SUPREME COURT
RESPONDS TO A CHANGING SOCIETY, 1890-1920, at 424-25 (1978), for a discussion
on the influence of the Fourteenth Amendment in increasing the exercise of judicial
review.
31 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905).
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universe, and of the mystery of human life."32 By the dawn of the
twenty-first century, the personal environment had become a
primary touchstone of civil rights law.
One harbinger of this shift was Warren and Brandeis's
article "The Right to Privacy," in which the authors celebrated
the law's discovery of "man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and
his intellect"33 and argued for legal protection for "[tihoughts,
emotions, and sensations."34
It would be several decades before this kind of thinking
reached the case law, and it did so initially in dissent. In a 1928
decision, Olmstead v. United States, Justice Brandeis used a
minority opinion in a case about criminal wiretap evidence to
urge judicial protection for internal states of being:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the
significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and
satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against
the government, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men.35
By 1943, this kind of thinking captured a majority for the first
time in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette."
The Barnette case was a challenge to a school's requirement that
children pledge allegiance to the American flag-a pledge alleged
by the parents to violate the children's Jehovah's Witness faith.
While the issue was thus phrased in terms of religious freedom,
the Court opted for a more expansive approach, treating the
claim as one of spiritual and psychic autonomy: "The sole conflict
is between authority and rights of the individual. ... [The
plaintiffs] stand on a right of self-determination in matters that
touch individual opinion and personal attitude."3 8 The state's sin
" See Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
" Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193, 193 (1890).
1 Id. at 195.
35 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
36 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
37 See id. at 629-30.
38 Id. at 630-31.
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lay not so much in requiring religious observation as in requiring
a more general "affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind."3 1
On this view, forced political conformity was as bad as forced
religious observance, for "no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their
faith therein."40 Accordingly, the Court wrote, the law "invades
the sphere of intellect and spirit" and must be struck down.4 '
Barnette may have been the first Supreme Court case to
focus on the internal consequences of state action, but it was far
from the last. Later cases would build upon Barnette's
commitment to law as a tool for internal regulation. In one of the
twentieth century's judicial landmarks, Brown v. Board of
Education,4 2 the Court rejected the concept of "separate but
equal" in public education because of the emotional harm posed
by segregation. In the central passage of the case, the Court
explained that "to separate [schoolchildren] from others . .. solely
because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds
in a way unlikely ever to be undone."4 3 While ostensibly Brown
was an equal protection case and could have been decided on
various technical legal grounds," it was this psychological insight
that held the key to the decision.
As the twentieth century progressed, the Court's attention to
the internal implications of rights law was further manifested in
a number of important cases in diverse areas of law. Much of
this development occurred in cases involving the right to privacy
argued for by Warren and Brandeis at the end of the previous
century. In abortion law, for example, beginning with Roe v.
Wade, the Court grappled with the question of rights in terms of
39 Id. at 633.
40 Id. at 642.
4 Id.
42 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
' Id. at 494.
4 See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, INTRODUCTION TO WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE
AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS DECISION 44-50, 53-54, 56-58 (Jack M. Balkin
ed., 2001).
4 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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the mental and spiritual well-being of women. The Roe opinion
zeroed in on the emotional impact of unwanted pregnancies in
upholding a woman's right to obtain an abortion:
This right of privacy ... is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant
woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific
and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy
may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force
upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological
harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be
taxed by child care. There is also the distress, for all concerned,
associated with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of
bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically
and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the
additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed
motherhood may be involved.46
The internal, emotional impact of pregnancy justified the
intervention of constitutional law in a previously
unconstitutionalized area.
In a later abortion case, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,4 7 the Court reiterated its view of rights
law as a means of spiritual caretaking. The Casey Court was
faced with several discrete restrictions on abortion, and had it
wished to do so, it could have resolved those questions within the
framework of existing abortion law. Roe v. Wade had been on the
books for nearly twenty years, and numerous precedents had
been established that provided some framework, even if not an
indisputable one, for evaluating subsequent restrictions of the
abortion right. In other words, to resolve the case, it was not
necessary that the Court do anything more than determine
where the challenged regulations fit within a fairly well-
developed body of law. And this is where the Court began,
invoking specific, analogous due process guarantees: "Our law
affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child
rearing, and education."4* But the Court went on to endorse a
much more sweeping form of constitutional oversight:
4 Id.
4 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
48 Id.
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At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of
the State. These considerations begin our analysis of the
woman's interest in terminating her pregnancy ....
Rather than applying facts to precedent, the Court took as its
starting point a vision of law as a tool of spiritual growth, a
vision encapsulated in its assertion later in the opinion that
"[tihe destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on
her own conception of her spiritual imperatives."s0 The abortion
right, like the rights of schoolchildren, became less a matter of
legalism than a matter of spiritualism.
In Casey, as in Barnette, the Court showed the extent of its
concern with the soul by conflating controls on behavior with
controls on belief. The laws at issue in Casey were attempts by a
state to control actions-to limit and to structure the
circumstances in which a woman could obtain an abortion. But
the Court's response to this was to treat it as an invasion of the
soul rather than as an invasion of the body, scolding that
"[bieliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were, they formed under the compulsion of the
State."5' Read carefully, this is a non sequitur. A woman who
cannot obtain an abortion under her preferred conditions is not
likely to change her beliefs about abortion on that basis alone,
and there was no suggestion in the Casey opinion or in the
statutes under review that Pennsylvania was trying to change
anyone's mind as opposed to regulating their activities. It is not
an inevitable response to a regulation of behavior to say that
one's ability to philosophize is in peril. But Casey seems to
proceed from a different logic altogether. The concern of the
Court is not merely liberty of the body; instead, it is the state of
the soul, and government action that might trouble the soul is
forbidden.
Nor is this vision of law reserved to the liberals on the Court.
In the Court's most recent abortion case, Gonzales v. Carhart,52 a
conservative majority used a spiritual rationale to uphold
' Id. at 851-52.
50 Id. at 852.
"x Id. at 851.
52 550 U.S. 124, 159-60 (2007).
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Congress's ban of partial-birth abortions. The Court relied in
part on the emotional impact of the banned procedures,
imagining a woman who procured an abortion only to learn later
of the distasteful method used by her doctor to terminate the
pregnancy. Congress, the Court said, had a legitimate interest
in protecting women from the psychic damage that such
knowledge might bring:
It is, however, precisely this lack of information concerning the
way in which the fetus will be killed that is of legitimate
concern to the State .... The State has an interest in ensuring
so grave a choice is well informed. It is self-evident that a
mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must struggle
with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she
learns, only after the event, what she once did not know: that
she allowed a doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-
developing brain of her unborn child, a child assuming the
human form.54
The content of civil rights law-in this case, expanding state
power rather than limiting it-was again determined by internal,
emotional considerations.
The same internal vision of law animated another recent
privacy case, Lawrence v. Texas," in which the Court struck
down a state law criminalizing same-sex sodomy. The Court took
the occasion again to affirm its sweeping vision of the proper
zone of constitutional authority: "Liberty presumes an autonomy
of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression and
certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the
person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent
dimensions."" In Lawrence, this liberty again took the form of
the correct psychic environment. The Texas law was wrong not
because it infringed on private sexual conduct-which the Court
had previously held protected in other contexts, such as marriage
and procreation-but because regulation of such conduct meant
that the state had impermissibly sought to "demean [the
plaintiffs'] existence or control their destiny."5
53 See id.
4 Id. (citation omitted).
55 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
" Id. at 562.
1 Id. at 578.
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The Court's attention to internal, spiritual states has not
been limited to privacy cases. Plyler v. Doe," like Brown, was an
equal protection case, in which the children of illegal immigrants
challenged a Texas law that would have denied them public
education. Striking down the law, the Court expressed its
disapproval of "governmental barriers presenting unreasonable
obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit....
[B]y depriving the children of any disfavored group of an
education, we foreclose the means by which that group might
raise the level of esteem in which it is held by the majority."
The Court's focus on the "esteem" in which one is held suggests
that the psychological effects of the law were important, a
suggestion that the Court made explicit later in the opinion:
"The inestimable toll of that deprivation [of education] on the
social[,] economic, intellectual, and psychological well-being of
the individual, and the obstacle it poses to individual
achievement ... [violates] the Equal Protection Clause." 0  The
message is clear: Laws that impair people's "intellectual and
psychological well-being" risk running afoul of the Constitution.
Law protects the internal realm as well as the realm of behavior.
First Amendment jurisprudence has also seen the use of law
to regulate internal states. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees" involved a
Minnesota law that required a private, all-male civic group to
admit women as members. Although the Court upheld the law,
thereby limiting the associational rights of the group's members,
it continued to make clear that the law would be attentive to the
internal needs of its subjects: "[I]ndividuals draw much of their
emotional enrichment from close ties with others. Protecting
these relationships from unwarranted state interference
therefore safeguards the ability independently to define one's
identity that is central to any concept of liberty."6 2 The role of
law is to police the "emotional enrichment" of citizens, thereby
keeping the path clear for the development of one's "identity."6 3
5 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982).
" Id. at 222.
6 Id.
61 468 U.S. 609, 612-13 (1984).
62 Id. at 619.
6 Id.
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Other First Amendment cases have likewise attended to the
internal realm. In the mid-1980s the Court began to develop the
so-called "endorsement test" in Establishment Clause cases. This
test, which first appeared in Justice O'Connor's concurrence in
Lynch v. Donnelly,6 4 measures alleged establishments of religion
to see whether they send a message of endorsement or
disapproval of religion. Any such message should be prohibited
because of its effects on the psyches of the auditors:
"Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders,
favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends
the opposite message." The more conventional approach to the
Establishment Clause had prevented government from favoring
one religion over another or conditioning the exercise of civil
rights on religious belief. The endorsement test, however, follows
the more modern trend in conditioning the validity of state action
on the feelings it engenders in those affected by it.
This emphasis on feelings was also seen in the First
66Amendment case of Lee v. Weisman, in which the Court relied
on emotional impact to rule against the use of prayer at a middle-
school graduation ceremony. The fatal flaw in the prayer,
according to the Court, was that it "forced" non-believing
students either to stand in apparent assent or to remain seated
in obvious dissent. Peer pressure might compel the student to
stand, contrary to her principles, while remaining seated might
6 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
66 Id. This test has twice commanded a majority of the Court, and it has become
a persistent presence in Establishment Clause cases, earning frequent citation and
the support of a number of Justices. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530
U.S. 290, 309-10 (2000); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389-90
(1985) (finding that a program providing education to parochial students at public
expense in public schools could send a "message" of government approval of religion
and could confer a "significant symbolic benefit to religion in the minds of some"),
modified by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223-25 (1997) (finding that not all
government aid funding religious schools violates the Establishment Clause as a
matter of course); see also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S.
753, 773 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 606 n.9
(1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring); Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 625-27
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 n.1
(1989).
( 505 U.S. 577, 593-94 (1992).
6 Id. at 593.
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draw unwanted attention.6 ' This "dilemma," in turn, could cause
"embarrassment and . .. intrusion" for the student, thereby
increasing her sense of "offense," "isolation," and "affront."" The
Court's "psycho-journey," as Justice Scalia called it in the
dissent70 emphasized, yet more strongly, that civil rights law
would be used to tend to the inner states of individuals.
All of these cases show that for the modern Supreme Court,
law has come to be seen as a means to safeguard the emotional,
psychic, and spiritual advancement of its citizens. Constitutional
decisions are meant not merely to resolve disputes, protect
property, or check state power but also to ensure the proper
conditions for the flourishing of individual souls. The internal
realm of which Hurst wrote has become an increasingly
important part of law's empire. The controlling principles of
modern rights law are something more than mere rules of law or
expressions of political philosophy. They are spiritual principles,
which place the Court as much in the line of Puritans John
Winthrop and Cotton Mather as of Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison. It remains, then, to connect this state of affairs to its
closest precedent in American culture: the Puritan culture of
seventeenth century New England.
III. PURITANISM: THE STATE AND THE SOUL
A. Puritanism and the Individual Soul
To understand the Puritan view of law, one must first
understand a few aspects of Puritan theology. The Puritans
believed in a precise and sometimes elaborate model of the soul's
71progress. Several important assumptions underlay this model;
these included the natural depravity of fallen man, the existence
of a covenant by which God would redeem the predestined elect,
the need for each person to work out his own salvation personally
and internally, and the need for strong church and civil
government to assist this process by mediating the correct
6 See id. at 593-94.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 643 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
n See Phyllis M. Jones, Puritan's Progress: The Story of the Soul's Salvation in
the Early New England Sermons, 15 EARLY AM. LITERATURE 14, 14 (1980).
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relationship between the individual and God.7 2 These premises
shaped the Puritan, and later the American, concept of the
proper relationship between the individual and human authority,
or law.
Much Puritan theology stemmed from the concept of
covenant, a special agreement by which God offers eternal life to
men, his unworthy creations.74 Covenant was considered the
exclusive path to salvation, for "God conveys his salvation by way
of covenant, and he doth it to those onely that are in covenant
with him."75 The original covenant was called the covenant of
works and was extended by God to Adam before the fall of man.
This covenant promised eternal life on condition of obedience to
divine law: "The [Covenant of works] faith, Doe this and
live ... the way of life which the Law propounds, is, Doe these
things comprehended in the Law, and doe them constantly, and
then thou shalt live."7 Salvation, therefore, was a matter of
human effort: "Adam had the stock in his own hand, and might
of himself by Grace received, have wrought out his own
Salvation."77  But Adam failed to obey, and by eating the
forbidden fruit, he demonstrated man's inability to obey God's
will. With the initial covenant broken, man's own efforts could
no longer suffice for salvation, "not because the covenant is
changed, but because we are changed, and cannot fulfill the
condition, to which the promise is made; the covenant stands
72 See LUCY BREGMAN, RELIGION, DEATH, AND DYING: VOLUME 3: BEREAVEMENT
AND DEATH RITUALS 4 (2010).
73 See GEORGE LEE HASKINS, LAW AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS: A
STUDY IN TRADITION AND DESIGN 158 (1960).
74 Puritan theology is also called "federal theology," from the Latin foedus, or
"covenant." See JOHN WITTE, JR., THE REFORMATION OF RIGHTS: LAW, RELIGION,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN EARLY MODERN CALVINISM 277-78 (2007), for a survey of
New England covenantal doctrine.
75 PETER BULKELEY, GOSPEL COVENANT OR THE COVENANT OF GRACE OPENED
47 (1651). The original reads, "those onlely without may fear of disappointing look
for his salvation"; I have corrected this apparent transposition. Most of the primary
Puritan sources cited in this Article were consulted on microfilm or as facsimile
reprints of the original texts. In quoting from these sources, I have preserved the
original capitalization, spelling, italics, and punctuation, with the exception of the
long "s."
76 Id. at 57.
77 THOMAS HOOKER, THE APPLICATION OF REDEMPTION 25 (Arno Press 1972)
(1657).
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fast, but we have not stood fast in the covenant."18 It was not the
covenant that was flawed but Adam and, by extension, all
mankind.
In purely contractual terms, God could have let matters rest
there and cast aside His creatures who had proved unworthy.
Yet in His infinite mercy, He sent Christ to die in atonement for
Adam's breach.7 9 God then offered another route to salvation, a
second covenant known as the covenant of grace. Unlike the
covenant of works, the covenant of grace did not depend on the
actions of man-who had proved himself incapable of right
behavior in Adam's fall-but instead required only a belief in the
saving power of Christ. "The first difference is in the condition of
the Covenants, the one requires doing, the other believing; the
one workes, the other faith; The one saith, Doe this and live, the
other saith, Believe and thou shalt be saved."8 0 The covenant of
grace did not nullify the ethical duties of God's law, but those
duties were transformed into acts of thankfulness for redemption
rather than the means by which redemption could be obtained:
Though the doctrine of grace command the same duties as the
covenant of workes doth, as of love, feare, and of keeping the
Commandments, and it ratifies the duties of the Law; yet here
is the difference, that they are commanded in another manner,
and for another end then in the covenant of workes; not as the
matter of our justification, but as testimonies of our
thankfulnesse for the great mercy of God in our free
justification by grace. Let us therefore keep these differences
unconfounded; for these two covenants are as different in their
nature, as heaven and earth.8'
Once entered, the covenant guaranteed life to man, because God
Himself was bound by its terms: "[Tihis grace we may stand and
wonder at, that the high God, who is free from all, and bound to
none, no, not to the Angels in Heaven, is yet pleased for our good
7 BULKELEY, supra note 75, at 56; see also WILLIAM PERKINS, THE FOUNDATION
OF CHRIsTIAN RELIGION GATHERED INTO SIX PRINCIPLES (1682), reprinted in THE
WORK OF WILLIAM PERKINS 146, 151 (Ian Breward ed., 1970); A Confession of Faith
Owned and Consented unto by the Elders and Messengers of the Churches Assembled
in Boston in New-England, May 12, 1680, in 2 COTTON MATHER, MAGNALIA CHRISTI
AMERICANA 161-62 (Applewood Books 2009) (1820) [hereinafter A Confession of
Faith].
" See A Confession of Faith, supra note 78, at 162-64.
80 BULKELEY, supra note 75, at 57.
" Id. at 165 (misnumbered as page 165 as in the original edition, the text skips
from page 109 to page 164).
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and benefit, to enter into bonds, and bind himselfe unto us in the
bond of a covenant, to blesse us, and to do us good."82 The
promise of free grace was a lifeline for sinful man, offering an
escape from eternal damnation, despite the unworthiness of
Adam and his descendants.
If the Puritans had left matters there, they might have been
among the sunniest of sects, enjoying the promise of free grace
and the assurance of covenantal salvation. But they were
Calvinists, who had a keen appreciation both of God's goodness
and of His wrath; in addition, they were astute psychologists who
understood Man's capacity for evil and self-deception. The
mixture of these elements in their theology meant that, while
grace was offered freely by God in the sense that it was the
product of His free and merciful will, it was emphatically not free
in the sense that it was there for anyone to take.
One of the more important aspects of Puritan theology was
the way in which it personalized the question of salvation. It was
a central tenet of Puritanism that each person must join the
covenant individually: "God conveys his blessings onely by
covenant, and this covenant must every soule enter into, every
particular soul must enter into a particular covenant with God;
out of this way there is no life."" To be saved, then, required
more than membership in a church or affiliation with a system of
belief; it meant a personal relationship with God and an
individual entrance into His covenant. This injected a measure
of urgency into the doctrine, for it placed the onus of looking to
one's salvation squarely on one's own shoulders; it also meant
that one's own weaknesses or failings could interfere with one's
membership in the covenant.
The Puritans added to personal responsibility the concept of
predestination.' This doctrine, which was central to Calvinism,
held that God "hath ordained all men to a certain and everlasting
estate, that is either to salvation or condemnation, for his own
glory."8 In other words, God has already identified the elect, also
known as the "saints," who are "predestined unto everlasting
82 Id. at 46.
8 Id. at 47.
*' See BREGMAN, supra note 72.
8 WILLIAM PERKINS, A GOLDEN CHAIN: OR THE DESCRIPTION OF THEOLOGY
(1597), reprinted in THE WORK OF WILLIAM PERKINS, supra note 78, at 169, 185-86;
see also WILLIAM AMES, THE MARROW OF THEOLOGY 154 (John D. Eusden ed. &
trans., Pilgrim Press 1968) (1623).
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life."8 6  These were the only persons who could join in the
covenant, for "[tihe objects of the covenant of grace are the elect
alone."8 7 On the other side of the ledger were the damned, or the
"reprobate," who were "fore-ordained unto everlasting death.""
All of this made membership in the covenant more than a point
of theological nicety; instead, it was quite literally a matter of
survival.
This naturally raised an important question: How could one
know whether one was saved or not? The answer lay within each
believer. The exact workings of grace were thought to be internal
and mysterious, "secret and Spiritual," 9 but their effects on the
soul could be discerned. To know one's status, therefore, one had
to look inward: "Would we then know whether we be of the
number of those that are saved by the bloud of the Covenant?
wee need not for this ascend up into heaven, to search the book of
Gods election. . . but goe down into our own hearts."90 The
Puritan literature is full of admonitions to search, to test, and to
doubt oneself, all for the sake of determining whether one be in
the covenant or not. Bulkeley put it in inquisitorial terms,
urging that "it were good for every one of us, that we would begin
to suspect ourselves, and to question our interest in this
Covenant."9' Hooker likewise urged an investigative approach:
"Examine your selves, prove your selves whether you be in the
Faith or no ... this is that all ought to try to & find out, & you
too or els you are to blame."92 Even Roger Williams, writing to
his wife in a more informal vein, sounded a note of warning:
[A] deep and frequent examination of our spirituall condition is
an excellent means of Christian health and temper .... This
dutie is hard, and therefoe we must often crie to God with
David .... Search me 0 God, and try my heart, and see if there
be any wicked way in me, and lead me in the way everlasting.93
8 A Confession of Faith, supra note 78, at 160.
87 JOHN NORTON, THE ANSWER TO THE WHOLE SET OF QUESTIONS OF THE
CELEBRATED MR. WILLIAM APPOLONIUS 54 (Douglas Horton trans., Belknap Press of
Harv. Univ. Press 1958) (1648).
* A Confession of Faith, supra note 78, at 160, 179.
" HOOKER, supra note 77, at 137.
9 BULKELEY, supra note 75, at 264.
11 Id. at 109.
9 HOOKER, supra note 77, at 107.
93 ROGER WILLIAMS, EXPERIMENTS OF SPIRITUAL LIFE AND HEALTH (1652),
reprinted in 7 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 42, 100-01 (Perry
Miller ed., Wipf & Stock Publishers 2007) (1652) (emphasis and citation omitted).
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Puritan spiritual life was in large part a constant process of self-
examination and wondering, searching for evidence that one was
saved instead of damned.
To guide this process, the Puritans developed a sometimes
elaborate taxonomy of salvation. There were some variations in
the details, but distilled to its most important elements, the
stages were (1) vocation, (2) preparation, (3) justification,
(4) sanctification, and (5) glorification.9 4 Vocation, or "effectual
calling," was the offering of grace by God to the soul of the elect."
"All those whom God hath praedestinated unto life, and those
only, he is pleased ... effectually to call by his word and spirit,
out of that state of sin and death. . . to grace and salvation by
Jesus Christ ... ." To respond to this call, the sinner had to
prepare himself to receive it. 97 This required recognizing one's
own corruption, and developing a fear of damnation and hatred of
sin that would allow grace to enter.9 8 Thomas Hooker captured
this with typically Puritan eloquence:
[I]n this Second Covenant of the Gospel ... it comes to pass
when the Lord will lay hold upon the proud heart of a Sinner
and draw him to himself, he Sinks his Spirit with the sence of
his own wretchedness, so that he sees and confesseth freely that
he is undone without Mercy, and yet conceives it's not possible
that ever such a worthless worm should partake thereof,
acknowledgeth it's just with God to deny to give, nay to offer
Grace to him, that hath slighted, rejected, opposed Grace from
day to day.... In a word, then is a man truly worthy[1 that
is[,] fit to hear of, and to receive mercy, when he is rightly,
really become apprehensive of his own unworthiness.9 9
Cotton Mather offered a more pastoral but no less chastening
image when he preached, "The earth is not more broken by the
plow tearing of it, than the heart of a repenting one is broken
with the sorrow of repentance."'00 This was not, nor was it meant
to be, a pleasant experience for the believer, as it required him to
' See discussion infra notes 119146.
95 See THOMAS HOOKER, THE SOULES VOCATION OR EFFECTUAL CALLING TO
CHRIST 33 (1638).
' A Confession of Faith, supra note 78, at 164.
97 See HOOKER, supra note 77, at 148-49.
98 See id.
9 Id.
' CorrON MATHER, AGRICOLA (1725), reprinted in THE PURITANS IN AMERICA:
A NARRATIVE ANTHOLOGY 331 (Alan Heimert & Andrew Delbanco eds., 1985).
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confront his own failings and to acknowledge his fitness for Hell.
Yet the alternatives were far worse, for God reserved special
punishment for those who turned away from His grace: "But
know this to thy everlasting terror, That if thou do continue thus
in the hardness and opposition of thy heart against Christ and
his Grace, that this Power of the Lord that would convert thee,
will put forth itself to confound thee to thine eternal ruine."'o'
If the soul were properly prepared, it was then ready for the
next step, which was justification. In this stage, the sinner
actually received the inflowing grace of God, his sins were
forgiven, and he was made fit for eternal life: "Justification is
the gracious judgment of God by which he absolves the believer
from sin and death, and reckons him righteous and worthy of life
for the sake of Christ apprehended in faith."102 Justification was,
in effect, a renewed judgment of God upon man, not, as in Eden,
a judgment of condemnation but a new judgment of salvation in
which "we are pronounced just and awarded the judgment of
life."' Justification was sometimes called "justification by
faith," because belief in Christ was viewed as the sole means by
which justification could occur: "Faith thus receiving and resting
on Christ, and his righteousness is the alone instrument of
justification . . . ."104 Faith was also a condition of entering the
covenant, for "[ilf Christ Purchased all for Beleevers as such,
then they must be such before they can challenge and take this
Purchase as their own, it is the Condition that Christ requires
upon which he communicates all that saving and spiritual
good."os
Those who were justified then experienced sanctification,
"the real change, wherein justification is manifested and its
consequences, so to speak, brought into being."06 The influx of
grace caused the saint "to be purged from the corruption of his
own nature" and "to be indued with inward righteousness."0o
The changes wrought by grace began in the soul but soon spread
to the will and then the body:
101 HOOKER, supra note 77, at 138.
102 AMES, supra note 85, at 161.
103 Id. at 172.
10 A Confession of Faith, supra note 78, at 165.
105 HOOKER, supra note 77, at 24.
11 AMES, supra note 85, at 167.
107 PERINS, supra note 78, at 159-60.
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Although the whole man partakes of this grace, it is first and
most appropriately in the soul and later progresses to the body,
inasmuch as the body of the man is capable of the same
obedience to the will of God as the soul. In the soul this grace is
found first and most appropriately in the will whence it passes
to other faculties according to the order of nature.10 8
Sanctification was therefore an internal change of state that had
behavioral consequences, leading the sanctified to act in ways
that were visible signs of redemption. As Bulkeley explained,
"[tirue sanctification cleaves to the whole law, and to all the
Commandments of it, seeking to doe and fulfill all; such an heart
the Lord requires ... and such he works, where he works Grace
in truth."'09 Notably, this meant that sanctification could be seen
as outward evidence of justification and thus, of a person's
election by God: "[W]e should search and see whether we have
been made partakers of this salvation promised. But how shall
we know that? even by our sanctification, if the Lord hath
renewed and sanctified our natures, and made us new creatures
in Christ.""10 And while the sanctified soul might stray from the
ways of God, being yet human, it would continually be drawn
back to righteousness. "True sanctification will never suffer the
soule to finde rest and peace, but onely in the way which is called
holy: A sanctified soule may step aside into the way which is not
good, but it can find no rest there ... ."
The final stage in this process was glorification, in which
God finally delivered the eternal life promised in His election of
the soul:
Glorification is the real change in man from misery, or the
punishment of sin, to eternal happiness. . .. [It] is actually
nothing but the carrying out of the sentence of justification. For
in justification we are pronounced just and awarded the
judgment of life. In glorification the life that results from the
pronouncement and award is given to us: We have it in actual
possession.112
Glorification thus was the opposite of damnation; a passing of a
sentence of eternal life instead of eternal torment.
1* AMES, supra note 85, at 169.
10 BULKELEY, supra note 75, at 266.
no Id. at 260.
"' Id. at 266.
112 AMES, supra note 85, at 171-72.
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It should be remembered that the goal of this process was
not to achieve salvation, since that was a decision that had
already been made by a predestining God. Rather, the goal was
to obtain knowledge of one's election, what the Puritans called
"comfort" or "consolation.""1 ' If the believer could find in his own
soul evidence of justification, or detect in his behavior true
sanctification, then he could take solace in the fact that he was
not destined for Hell:
It is a use of marvelous comfort, to those that do endeavour to
walk uprightly and faithfully in covenant with God ... here is
comfort for such, that the blessing of life and salvation is as
sure to such souls, as the covenant of a faithful God can make
it.... 114
Hooker seized on this assurance as a central goal of spiritual life,
urging his readers, "do not rest until you have made sure your
Evidence for Heaven and Happiness, that you may be able to say
I am sure Christ and al Saving good is mine.""' And, in a
beautiful set of metaphors, he described the effect of such
assurance on the elect:
[I]t is a ground of strong consolation (as the Apostle saith) to
beare up the hearts of Gods people in the day of death, that they
may lift up their heads with comfort, and looke grizzled death in
the face with courage and boldnesse; for the death of Christ
hath taken away the evill of thy death: therefore be thou not
troubled with it, nor dismaid by it; there is no bitternesse in
that pill, nor no venom in that cup to thee . .. for the sharpest
death of a Saint of God, is like a humble Bee that hath no sting
in it, which a childe may play withal, and not be hurt."'
Of course, human frailty could come between the sinner and God
at any time, and "a person who truly believes and is by faith
justified before God may for a time think that he neither believes
nor is reconciled to God.""' Worse, one could delude oneself into
thinking that he was saved when he was not, for "men may
vainly deceive themselves with false hopes, and carnal
1' See, e.g., JOHN COTTON, CHRIST THE FOUNTAINE OF LIFE 92 (Arno Press
1972) (1651) (describing the signs of the Christian life as "the life of righteousnesse
in our Justification, and of Sanctifiction, of comfort and consolation, and of eternall
glory").
114 BULKELEY, supra note 75, at 52.
n1 HOOKER, supra note 77, at 108.
11 THOMAS HOOKER, THE SOULES EXALTATION 207-08 (1638).
117 AMES, supra note 85, at 163.
164
KEEPERS OF THE NEW COVENANT
presumptions of being in the favour of God, and state of
salvation.""'s Even the saints, it seems, were bound to a life of
self-examination and at least occasional doubt.
The devout Puritan thus occupied a tenuous position. He
was in real danger of eternal damnation, which he could escape
only by being among the elect. He could learn of his election only
by debasing himself before God and believing himself fit for Hell,
then examining his soul for the minutest signs of inward grace,
which might or might not come and which, once found, might or
might not be real. At the same time, while his own deeds could
not merit his salvation, there were nonetheless requirements of
behavior and attitude that had to be met in order to seek and to
keep the covenant. While God could, if He chose, provide the
elect with sure and easy knowledge of their salvation, He instead
demanded a process that was anything but certain and which
demanded self-abasement, fear, and trepidation. Roger Williams
distilled this problem to what he called a "Christian riddle":
[W]hy is it, since God worketh freely in us to do and to will of
his own good pleasure, that yet he is pleased to command us to
work out our own salvation with fear and trembling? Let us all
humbly beg the finger (the spirit) of the Lord to untie these
knots for us." 9
It is small wonder, then, that one modern commentator could
describe Puritan spirituality as "a tortured solipsism."12 0 The
internalization of salvation, the burden of individual
responsibility in seeking God, and the prospect of eternal
damnation for failure brought relentless pressure to bear on each
believer.
This anxiety could-and often did-pervade everyday life.
Samuel Sewall, a prominent merchant and magistrate who
officiated in the Salem witchcraft trials, recorded in his diary
"[bleing distressed with melancholy and troubled concerning my
State."'2 1 The following year he wrote, "I have been exceedingly
tormented in my mind... [s]ometimes with my own unfitness
and want of Grace." 22 Years later, the diarist records the
118 A Confession of Faith, supra note 78, at 169.
n9 WILLIAMS, supra note 93, at 209.
120 Id. at 15.
121 1 THE DIARY OF SAMUEL SEWALL, 1674-1729, at 16 (M. Halsey Thomas ed.,
1973) (entry for May 23, 1676).
122 Id. at 39 (entry for Mar. 21, 1676).
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anguish of his daughter Betty, who after dinner one night "burst
out into an amazing cry," because "she was afraid she should goe
to Hell, her Sins were not pardon'd."12 3 The entry concludes with
the father's poignant prayer: "The Lord bring Light and Comfort
out of this dark and dreadful Cloud, and Grant that Christ's
being formed in my dear child, may be the issue of these painfull
pangs."12 4 John Winthrop recorded a more tragic episode in
which a young woman, tormented by doubt over the state of her
soul, threw her baby down a well so that she would at least know
for sure that she was damned-knowledge of Hell apparently
being preferable to a state of perpetual doubt.125  While the
Puritans may not always have been as dour as Hawthorne and
others have painted them, clearly there was much in the doctrine
to make spiritual life difficult.
In the search for salvation it could be particularly hard to
determine exactly where human effort ended and free grace took
over, and this ambiguity was an important one. A rigorous belief
in predestination would suggest that individual action should not
matter at all in the scheme of salvation. Of course, such a belief
would not be greatly conducive to civil society-which was a
special concern of the Puritans, as we shall see-for it would offer
nothing to encourage useful and sociable behavior. Nor would it
be consistent with the concept of covenant, which implies not
unilateral promise but reciprocal obligation. As a party to a
covenant, there must have been something that man had to do in
exchange for grace. As Bulkeley put it, "this is not properly a
Covenant, where there is not a mutuall obligation and binding of
the parties one to another by condition."2 6 And the Puritans did
believe in free will, which at least implied the possibility that the
elect could fall away from grace completely-though this seemed
to be balanced by a belief that they would always come around to
God in the end.127  Thus, the Puritan scheme of salvation
1" Id. at 345-46 (entry for Jan. 13, 1695).
124 Id. at 346.
125 THE ANTINOMIAN CONTROVERSY, 1636-1638: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 15
(David D. Hall ed., Duke Univ. Press 2d ed. 1999) (1968).
126 BULKELEY, supra note 75, at 314.
127 The tenets of the 1680 Confession of Faith capture this tension. Chapter IX,
"Of Free-Will," states that grace imbues the sinner with a will to do good, while his
corrupt nature continues to cause him to will what is evil. See A Confession of Faith,
supra note 78, at 164. But chapter XIII, "Of Sanctification," insists that in the elect,
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required affirmative acts of faith, self-abasement, self-
examination, and right behavior, if not as conditions of God's
favor, then as conditions of the quest for assurance. John Cotton
urged his readers to "labor for justification,"'2 8 as if human effort
really did count for something, and "to work out one's salvation"
was a common verb in the Puritan dialect. Puritan doctrine thus
harbored a delicate balance between works and grace, a subtlety,
a paradox, or a flat contradiction, depending on one's point of
view.12 9 It is not clear that the Puritans ever resolved these
questions fully, and they were to become a breeding ground for
controversy, most notably the Antinomian Crisis, which is
further discussed below.
But whether or not the Puritans made sense on their own
terms, their ideas established cultural patterns that continue to
echo in our own time. One of the most important of these for our
purposes is the constant focus on the individual. The central
question of salvation was addressed to each person individually;
there was no chosen people of which one might be a part; there
were only chosen persons, which one might or might not be. The
search for assurance furthered the theme of individualism, for it
meant that a major goal of Puritan life was the achievement of a
particular psychological state. The Puritan focus on the
individual would find its later counterpart in the American
obsession with individual development and individual rights.
But the individual was not to be left on his own, neither then
nor now. The Puritans believed that the process of seeking
assurance, and the accompanying mechanism of justification,
sanctification, and glorification, were the exclusive channels of
spiritual development. Hence, individual salvation took on a
structure, a well-defined system within which salvation could be
known and without which it could not. As the next Section will
show, this led to a particular conception of the role of social
authority-both the Church and the civil government-in
the "continual supply of strength from the sanctifying spirit of Christ" will
eventually counteract the effects of this lingering corruption. Id. at 166.
128 JOHN COTION, THE WAY OF LIFE (1641), reprinted in 13 A LIBRARY OF
AMERICAN PURITAN WRITINGS: THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY, 345 (Sacvan
Bercovitch ed., AMS Press 1991) (1689).
129 For a detailed treatment of the problem, see PERRY MILLER, ERRAND INTO
THE WILDERNESS 48-98 (1956).
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overseeing the individual's progress. These themes of internal
development and institutional oversight would become hallmarks
of American law long after the passing of the Puritan regime.
B. The Church, the State, and the Individual
The Puritan model of salvation may have centered on the
individual experience of grace, but the individual was not to be
left to his own devices in seeking assurance. Instead, the soul's
development required the right relationship between human
authority and the individual believer.3 0 The Puritans saw their
American venture as a program for the saving of souls for the
glory of God, and they believed that they had been specially
selected by God for the task.'3 ' This epochal sense of mission,
sharpened by the challenge of settling a wilderness, led to the
creation of well-defined structures of church and state.13 2 These
human institutions had a particular role to play in the saving of
souls, and they were quick to defend themselves against any
suggestions that their role was secondary or superfluous.133 The
resulting mode of spiritual oversight struck a note in American
public life that would echo in the American law of the twentieth
and twenty-first centuries.134
1. The Ends of America
The Puritans' emphasis on human authority was colored by
their concept of their mission in the New World. The Puritan
settlers believed that they were sent not only to colonize a
formerly unsettled land but to build a new and exemplary
outpost of Christ.'35 Edward Johnson captured this mood in a
contemporary history of Puritan New England, writing in the
voice of an English Puritan about to embark for Massachusetts
Bay:
130 See FRANCIS J. BREMER, THE PURITAN EXPERIMENT: NEW ENGLAND SOCIETY
FROM BRADFORD TO EDWARDS 19-21 (Univ. Press of New England rev. ed. 1995)
(1976).
131 See id. at 41-42.
132 See id. at 55.
13 See Edmund S. Morgan, Introduction to PURITAN POLITICAL IDEAS, 1558-
1794, at xxix-xxxi (Edmund S. Morgan ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 2003) (1965).
'" See Leonard W. Levy & Alfred Young, Foreword to PURITAN POLITICAL
IDEAS, supra note 133, at v-vi.
13s See BREMER, supra note 130, at 42.
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I am now prest for the service of our Lord Christ, to re-build the
most glorious Edifice of Mount Sion in a Wildernesse, and as
John Baptist, I must cry, Prepare yee the way of the Lord, make
his paths strait, for behold hee is comming againe, hee is
comming to destroy Antichrist, and give the whore double to
drinke the very dregs of his wrath.'36
Those who were part of the first settlements echoed this sense of
mission. Preaching on board the ship Arabella, John Winthrop,
the nearly perpetual governor of Massachusetts Bay, declared
that the settlers had been given a "special commission"137 from
God and that the world would be watching them: "we must
consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill. The eyes of all
people are upon us . ... Winthrop also linked the
establishment of the colony to the cause of individual salvation:
"The end is to improve our lives to do more service to the
Lord ... and work out our salvation under the power and purity
of his holy ordinances." 39 This attitude descended to later
generations as well. Peter Bulkeley, for example, reiterated both
Winthrop's vision of a sacred charge and his connection between
the New England polity and personal salvation:
And thou New-England, which art exalted in privileges of the
Gospel above many other people. . . consider the great things
the Lord hath done for thee.... Thou has many bright starres
shining in thy firmament, to give thee the knowledge of
salvation from on high, to guide thy feet in the way of peace ....
Thou shouldt be a speciall people, an onely people, none like
thee in all the earth... .140
In a still later generation Cotton Mather described the colonies
as "a New-English Israel"' 1 and claimed that the pre-Puritan
settlements had failed because they were "aimed no higher than
the advancement of some worldly interests ... until there was a
plantation erected upon the nobler designs of Christianity."'4 2
136 EDWARD JOHNSON, WONDER-WORKING PROVIDENCE OF SIONS SAVIOUR IN
NEW-ENGLAND 52 (J. Franklin Jameson ed., Charles Scribner's Sons 1910) (1654).
m JOHN WINTHROP, A MODEL OF CHRISTIAN CHARITY (1630), reprinted in THE
PURITANS IN AMERICA: A NARRATIVE ANTHOLOGY, supra note 100, at 90.
13 Id. at 91.
139 Id. at 89.
140 BULKELEY, supra note 75, at 15-16.
141 1 COTTON MATHER, MAGNALIA CHRISTI AMERICANA 44 (Silas Andrus & Son
1853) (1702).
142 Id. at 65-66.
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Yet with this great opportunity came great responsibility.
Although the world was watching, God was watching even more
closely. Winthrop cautioned that "when God gives a special
commission he looks to have it strictly observed in every
article."14 3 Should the colonists fail, by "embrac[ing] this present
world and prosecut[ing] our carnal intentions," God "will surely
break out in wrath against us, be revenged of such a perjured
people, and make us know the price of the breach of such a
covenant." 144 Bulkeley, too, warned New England that the price
of failure would be high: "The more thou hast committed unto
thee, the more thou must account for. No peoples account will be
heavier than thine, if thou doe not walke worthy of the meanes of
thy salvation. The Lord looks for more from thee, than from
other people . . . ."145 The work of God was righteous, but there
was little room for error.4
2. The Church and the Ministry
If the Puritans were to fulfill their destiny in the New World,
they would need human institutions through which to act for the
glory of God and the salvation of souls. Chief among these was
the organized church. Broadly speaking, the New England
Puritans were Congregationalists, reformed Protestants who
believed that each congregation should be self-governing. 14 7 This
was in contrast to the Presbyterian model, which advocated the
oversight of multiple congregations by centralized bodies of
church elders. Periodically, the New England congregations
would meet in synods to discuss matters affecting them
collectively; while such efforts led to periodic charges of
Presbyterianism, they were typically defended as permissible
examples of cooperation, not centralized church government.A8
Within each congregation, leadership usually consisted of one or
o WINTHROP, supra note 137.
1" Id. at 90-91.
145 BULKELEY, supra note 75, at 16.
" As a product of this sense of mission and responsibility, the Puritans
developed the literature of the jeremiad, consisting of writings and sermons warning
the people of their backsliding and predicting the wrath of God as a consequence. A
well known study of this phenomenon is SACVAN BERCOVITCH, THE AMERICAN
JEREMIAD (1978).
147 See BREMER, supra note 130, at 105-13, for a brief overview of Puritan
church government.
1n See id. at 112-13.
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more ministers, sometimes aided by a group of lay elders.'
Membership in a church was reserved for the "visible saints,"
those who could give believable testimony that they had attained
knowledge of their election. 5 0
While there were various controversies about the fine details
of church government, there were two fundamental principles on
which nearly all Puritans agreed: (1) the foundation of each
church was a covenant between its members, and (2) the
ministry had a central role to play in helping believers to work
out their salvation. These tenets would undergird efforts by the
church to cement its role as an authoritative participant in the
salvation of each individual.
a. The Church Covenant
The Puritans considered church membership to be essential
to spiritual life. As John Cotton wrote,
[Ilt is the part of all Christians, who look for salvation by Christ
Jesus, to joyn themselves (if God give them opportunity) to some
one or other such a particular visible Church of Christ . .. that
so he may not deprive himselfe of the benefit and comfort of any
of Gods holy Ordinances."'5
The concept of covenant, in turn, was central to the Puritan
concept of the church. Just as each believer had to enter a
covenant with God to be saved, so each member of a church had
to enter into a covenant with the other members in order to
participate in the life of the church, and hence, in the life offered
through Christ. The church covenant was separate from the
covenant of grace but linked to it as the means to an end. As
John Norton explained, "[t]he covenant of grace contains
salvation itself; the church covenant is the ordinary means of
being linked with this salvation: it marks the external
application of the covenant of grace and the institution of
worship within it."152
1 See id. 108-09.
150 See id. at 105, 110.
'1 JOHN COTTON, THE WAY OF THE CHURCHES OF CHRIST IN NEW ENGLAND 2
(1645), reprinted in 12 A LIBRARY OF AMERICAN PURITAN WRITINGS: THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (Sacvan Bercovitch ed., AMS Press 1991) (1689).
152 NORTON, supra note 87, at 55.
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A church covenant was defined as "a mutual engagement of
faithful people, explicitly or implicitly expressed, to walk with
God and with each other in the polity of the Gospel."' 3 The
covenant could be express or implied, 54 but the Puritans were
fond of the written word, and some of the early church covenants
have survived. Edward Johnson records one example:
We ... do here in the name of Christ Jesus, as in the presence
of the Lord, from the bottom of our hearts agree together
through his grace to give up our selves, first unto the Lord
Jesus as our only King, Priest and Prophet, wholly to be subject
unto him in all thing[s], and therewith one unto another, as in a
Church-Body to walk together in all the Ordinances of the
Gospel, and in all such mutual love and offices thereof, as
toward one another in the Lord .... 5
This excerpt illustrates two key aspects of a covenant: the
consent of the members to be bound-"we . .. do ... agree
together ... to give up our selves"-and the mutual obligation of
the covenant members that results-"we ... give up our
selves ... one unto another." Thus, an erstwhile member of a
church must "willingly binde and ingage himself to each member
of that society to promote the good of the whole, or else a member
actually he is not."' 6
In part, subscribing to a church covenant meant engaging in
the churchly duties of attendance, financial support, and
righteous conduct. But the covenant also carried with it the duty
of monitoring and helping fellow church members as they sought
assurance of salvation. Bulkeley admonished his readers to
"aske others"' 7 whether one was in the covenant of grace or not,
and it was within the church covenant that this could most
readily occur. Indeed, spiritual surveillance of others was a
positive duty of church membership, as illustrated by one early
account of a church founding:
15 Id.; see also AMES, supra note 85, at 180 ("This bond is a covenant . .. by
which believers bind themselves individually to perform all those duties toward God
and toward one another which relate to the purpose [ratio] of the church and its
edification.").
15 See COTrON, supra note 151, at 3.
15 JOHNSON, supra note 136, at 216.
1 THOMAS HOOKER, A SURVEY OF THE SUMME OF CHURCH-DISCIPLINE 50 (Arno
Press 1972) (1648).
157 See BULKELEY, supra note 75, at 109.
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[T]hey joyned together in a holy Covenant with the Lord, and
one with another, promising by the Lords Assistance to walke
together in Exhorting, Admonishing, and Rebuking one another,
and to cleave to the Lord with a full purpose of heart, according
to the blessed Rules of his Word made known unto them .....
To aid in this project, the churches developed internal modes of
discipline, including reproof, censure, and, in extreme cases,
excommunication.159  The members of the church had "church-
power over one another mutually,"o watching, admonishing, and
monitoring one another's souls to ensure the success of the
project of salvation.
There was more at stake than the merely personal, however.
Success in individual spirituality would also ensure the success
of the colonies in their mission to establish the New English
Israel. Church discipline therefore could serve both individual
and collective goals; conversely, its failure could have dire
consequences. Controls were needed both to guide the fallen in
their search for assurance and to guide the colonies in fulfilling
God's charge. Thus, the church covenant was a gateway to the
covenant of grace but on terms that show the Puritan reluctance
to leave the soul unsupervised.
b. The Ministry and the Word
Within the structure of the church, it was the written Word
of God-the Bible-that was the key to bringing souls to Christ.
And it was human authority, in the form of the ministry, that
was most effective in bringing sinners to the Word and, therefore,
to God.
The Word was essential to Puritan belief, for although the
operations of grace were internal, the Word was the external
means by which a person could attain faith and, through faith,
justification. John Cotton, like most other Puritan divines, could
discern a "marvelous power" in the scriptures "to supply faith,
158 JOHNSON, supra note 136, at 47.
1 See, e.g., THE MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES art. 95(4) (1641),
reprinted in PURITAN POLITICAL IDEAS, 1558-1794, supra note 133, at 200
(guaranteeing to churches the free exercise of "Admission, Recommendation,
Dismission and Expulsion, or deposall of their officers and members, upon due
cause").
160 A Platform of Church Discipline, in 2 MATHER, supra note 78, at 186.
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and the defects of it in every Beleever."'" While the "light of
nature" and the "works of creation and providence" could
manifest God's greatness, they alone were not sufficient to
provide "that knowledge of God and of his will, which is
necessary unto salvation ... which maketh the holy scripture to
be most necessary. "162 It was therefore basic Puritan doctrine
that "[tihis promise of Christ and salvation by him, is revealed
only in and by the word of God .... [Tihe gospel [is] the only
outward means of revealing Christ and saving grace . "16
The Word alone, however, was not enough. In order for
fallen Man to realize its benefits, a mediator was needed-
someone to explain its meaning and to ensure its impact on the
soul of every believer. This task required God's "faithful
Ministers," to whom God "hath delegated the dispensation of his
Word (in a way of Explication and Application of it)."'" Without
the ministry, man could not hope to approach the salvation
offered by God, for although "God himselfe ... is the Principal
Cause" of salvation, the "Ministry of the Word" was "the
Instrumental Cause of the Application of all saving good.""'5
The minister's "application," or explication, of the Word was
carried out mainly through preaching, for "we receive the Spirit
of sanctification, not by the workes of the Law, but by hearing of
faith preached.""' While the Puritan faithful were expected to
read the Bible on their own, the ministry, as special agents of
God, could better bring its meaning home. "Faith cometh by
hearing of the Word of God: it is not meant that faith comes by
hearing of the Word read, for that kind of preaching is here
meant for which a man is sent ... but for bare reading no man
had need to be sent."167 In other words, a special kind of human
aid was required to set the soul on the correct path to God.
Part of what made preaching so important was the minister's
ability-at least in theory-to tailor the message of the Word to
161 COTTON, supra note 113, at 198; see also PERKINS, supra note 78, at 148
("Faith cometh only by the preaching of the Word and increaseth daily by it.").
162 A Confession of Faith, supra note 78, at 157.
16 Id. at 171.
164 HOOKER, supra note 77, at 134.
1" Id. at 135.
166 BULKELEY, supra note 75, at 253; see also AMES, supra note 85, at 191 ("Here
the preaching of the word is of the utmost importance, and so it has always been of
continuous use in the church.").
167 HOOKER, supra note 77, at 134.
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each listener. The listeners were to be "pricked to the quick so
that they feel individually ... that the word of the Lord is a two-
edged sword, piercing to the inward thoughts and affections and
going through to the joining of bones and marrow."' Hooker
wrote of the personal effect of the minister's mediation:
[W1hen the Word is rightly opened, and rightly applied, it works
then more powerfully, because dispensed .. . according to the
weakness of them to whom it is delivered, as the chewing of
meat fits it for the Stomach, and therefore it nourisheth it more,
the pounding of Pouder makes it smel more: so it is with the
Word when opened and applied according to the mind of God.'
In chewing this spiritual meat for his congregation, it was the
duty of the minister to take account of each member's needs,
"giv[ing] to every one their portion, terrour to whom terrour
belongs, and comfort to whom comfort belongs."o Yet the
congregant could not listen passively, for the role of the ministry
ultimately was to aid in the process of ferreting out one's own
weakness, sin, and hardness of heart:
Therefore, when you come into the congregation, and see the
Minister giving and parting to every one his dole; reproofe here,
and instruction there; looke up to heaven, and labour to get
something to thy own particular, and say ... something for me,
Lord, something for me, instruct me, reprove me, make known
my sins, and discover my abominations.171
Attendance upon preaching required the active participation of
the individual in searching for light, and a serious Puritan would
take the occasion to find "out your sin by the help of the
Minister."'7 2 Perkins captured the urgency of the process by
exhorting the faithful to come to a sermon "with hunger-bitten
hearts, having an appetite to the word."'7 3 If right preaching was
accompanied by right hearing, then the Word could not fail to
reach its mark, for "[tihere was never any convicting ministry,
nor any man that did in plainness apply the Word home, but
their people would be reformed by it."'7 4
.e. AMES, supra note 85, at 193-94.
169 HOOKER, supra note 77, at 133-34.
170 THOMAS HOOKER, THE SOUL'S PREPARATION FOR CHRIST OR A TREATISE OF
CONTRITION 60 (Int'l Outreach, Inc. 1994) (1632).
171 Id.
172 Id. at 197.
173 PERKINS, supra note 78, at 162.
174 HOOKER, supra note 170, at 52.
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The Puritan concept of the Word placed a layer of human
authority between the believer and God in the quest for
salvation. There was a written text to guide the soul, and a body
of hierophants to mediate the truths of the text to the individual.
This was widely seen-and probably widely functioned-as a
benevolent state of affairs, offering a way of facilitating salvation
rather than constraining the quest. But the potential for
authoritarianism was clear and offered another indication that
Puritanism did not entirely trust mankind.
3. Civil Government and Church Discipline
The same concept of covenant that underlay church polity
also appeared in the Puritan view of civil government. John
Cotton expressed a mainstream Puritan belief when he extended
the covenantal view of church government to civil relationships:
"[Ilt is evident by the light of nature, that all civill relations are
founded in Covenant.... [T]here is no other way given whereby
a people (sui juris) free from naturall and compulsory
engagements, can be united or combined together into one visible
body, but onely by mutuall Covenant.""' Like the church
covenant, the hallmarks of the civil covenant were consent of the
members to be bound and their mutual obligation thereafter.
These elements are illustrated by perhaps the most famous
example of a Puritan civil covenant, the Mayflower Compact:
We, whose names are underwritten ... doe .. . convenant and
combine ourselves together into a civill body politick, for our
better ordering and preservation ... and by virtue hereof to
enacte, constitute, and frame such just and equall laws,
ordinances, acts, constitutions, and offices, from time to time, as
shall be thought most meete and convenient for the generall
good of the Colonie unto which we promise all due submission
and obedience.'
The notion of consent to be bound appears in the colonists' pledge
to "combine ourselves," instead of being forced to combine by
others.'77 The mutual obligation that flows from this consent is
seen in the promise of "all due submission and obedience" to the
17 COTION, supra note 151, at 4.
176 The Mayflower Compact (1620), reprinted in AMERICAN HISTORICAL
DOCUMENTS 1000-1904, at 59 (Charles W. Eliot ed., Grolier Enters. Corp. 1980)
(1910).
"7 Id.
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"generall good" of the new colony.17 ' These principles were
repeated elsewhere in the Puritan literature. John Winthrop
preached on board the ship Arabella, bearing the first wave of
colonists to Massachusetts Bay, that "the work we have in
hand ... is by a mutual consent,"11 7 just as he declared several
years later that "[n]o commonwealth can be founded but by free
consent."8 o The Arabella sermon also expressed the resulting
obligations of the commonwealth members:
For this end, we must be knit together in this work as one man.
We must entertain each other in brotherly affection, we must be
willing to abridge ourselves of our superfluities, for the supply
of others' necessities. We must uphold a familiar commerce
together in all meekness, gentleness, patience, and liberality.
We must delight in each other, make others' conditions our own,
rejoice together, mourn together, labor and suffer together,
always having before our eyes our commission and community
in the work, our community as members of the same body. So
shall we keep the unity of the spirit in the bond of peace.' 8'
Like the Puritan church, the Puritan state was founded on
federal principles.
The Puritans did preserve some distinctions between church
and state. For example, clergymen, however influential, were
ineligible for civil office.182 Still, the New England way was not
so much a separation of church and state as a symbiosis of the
two, which were "inextricably linked in nature and in
function."83 In its milder form, this consisted of the idea that
church and state were harmonious means to the same end: the
building of the American Israel, the city on a hill that would
shine forth Christianity to the world. There was a strong sense
among the Puritans that godliness must permeate the colonies
and that ensuring such godliness was the task of civil
government. The 1649 Platform of Church Discipline posed as
an article of church doctrine that "[tihe end of the magistrates
office is not only the quiet and peaceable life of the subject in
matters of righteousness and honesty, but also in matters of
178 Id.
179 WINTHROP, supra note 137, at 89.
180 Id. at 165.
' Id. at 91.
182 See BREMER, supra note 130, at 93; see also WITTE, supra note 74, at 309-10.
1" WITTE, supra note 74, at 310.
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godliness; yea, of all godliness." 8 4 Edward Johnson, in his 1654
history of New England, argued that the Puritans had removed
from England to America "not ... for the Land, but for the
government, that our Lord Christ might raigne over us, both in
Churches and Common-wealth."'8 5  And John Cotton told a
European audience that in America, "church government ... can
most beautifully accord with civil government. Like Hippocrates'
twins the two laugh and cry together." 86
All of this suggested that church government and civil
government were independent yet complementary structures for
maintaining a holy commonwealth. But many Puritans seem to
have gone a step farther, viewing civil government as less a
sibling than a servant of the church. Hooker, for instance,
classified civil government as "the Inferiour helping cause" of the
visible church, God being the principal such cause. 8 In many
cases, the civil government lent its strength to the churches, not
only by giving them the freedom to operate but also by enforcing
adherence to many of their tenets. For example, the
Massachusetts Body of Liberties, a 1641 codification of the
colony's civil law, guaranteed a number of liberties to the
churches, including the election of officers, the admission,
discipline and excommunication of members, and the right to
hold private meetings. 8 Such a list could be seen as merely a
guarantee of religious freedoms, not a blending of church and
state. But the code also asserted an affirmative role for civil
government in policing religious behavior, imposing the death
penalty for the worship of false gods and blasphemy,'8 9 and
granting the civil authorities the power to "see the peace,
ordinances and Rules of Christ observed in every church
according to his word, so it be done in a Civill and not in an
Ecclesiastical way."'90 This sort of interrelationship could make
one wonder exactly where civil power ended and church power
began.
18 A Platform of Church Discipline, supra note 160, at 203.
18 JOHNSON, supra note 136, at 146.
18 John Cotton, Foreward to NORTON, supra note 87, at 11.
187 HOOKER, supra note 156, at 12.
1 See THE MASSACHUSETIS BODY OF LIBERTIES, supra note 159, at 199-202.
18 See id. at 197.
18 Id. at 190.
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The line between the two was especially blurry in the
Puritans' ongoing struggle with the question of religious
tolerance. The Puritans' premigration experiences in England
had shown the dangers of official orthodoxy. Ongoing civil and
religious strife had led to a number of prosecutions, and more
than one of the leaders of the American Puritans had fled
England to escape official disfavor and possibly worse.'9 ' Thus,
there were some for whom the establishment of the American
Israel on correct principles required at least some leeway for
those who entertained divergent religious views-at least so long
as they professed some form of Christianity.'92
But there were many who believed that a stricter religious
orthodoxy was required, both to keep public order and to ensure
the success of the American mission. Johnson's exhortation was
typical: "[Olur Magistrates, being conscious of ruling for Christ,
dare not admit of any bastardly brood to be nurst up upon their
tender knees . ... "193 Hooker sidestepped the matter in his A
Survey of the Summe of Church-Discipline, but could not resist
the trenchant observation that he was "not yet perswaded that
the chief Magistrate should stand a Neuter, and tolerate all
Religions."'94 The forces of intolerance frequently had their way.
The Massachusetts Puritans banished Roger Williams in 1635,
and Anne Hutchison in 1638.'6 They jailed and whipped
Baptists in 1651.196 In the late 1650's a number of Quakers were
variously whipped, banished, mutilated, and hanged.' Such
acts were explained-if not justified-by the need to preserve
social order, 98 but the line appeared to be drawn very finely
between matters of religious orthodoxy and matters of public
"' Thomas Shepard and John Cotton were notable examples. See THE PURITANS
IN AMERICA: A NARRATIVE ANTHOLOGY, supra note 100, at 6, 27. On the English
persecution of Puritans generally, see BREMER, supra note 130, at 29-32, 41-46.
192 See, e.g., Henry Vane, A Brief Answer (1637), reprinted in THE PURITANS IN
AMERICA: A NARRATIVE ANTHOLOGY, supra note 100, at 169-70.
1s JOHNSON, supra note 136, at 146.
194 HOOKER, supra note 156, at 13.
195 Hutchinson's case will be discussed more thoroughly in Part IV below. For an
overview of the Williams controversy, see BREMER, supra note 130, at 62-70.
19 See id. at 138-40.
11 See id. at 154-58.
198 See, e.g., JOHN WINTHROP, A DEFENSE OF AN ORDER OF COURT (1637),
reprinted in THE PURITANS IN AMERICA: A NARRATIVE ANTHOLOGY, supra note 100,
at 164-67; Ecclesiarum Palia: Or the Disturbances Given to the Churches of New-
England [hereinafter Ecclesiarum Peelia], in 2 MATHER, supra note 78, at 525-26.
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safety. The state, as well as the church, took an official interest
in the soul, either to keep it on the correct path or to counteract
its pernicious influence on the American Israel.
Through the church, the ministry, and the magistrate,
Puritan New England combined an intense focus on the internal
state of the individual with well-defined, hierarchical structures
to ensure the proper conditions for the development of the soul.
As historian Stephen Foster summarized it, the "central Puritan
vision" was one of a society in which "the magistracy guaranteed
the social conditions under which the laity, part volunteers and
part conscripts, pursued their individual destinies in a collective
context interpreted and mediated by the clergy."' The role of
law in this calculus was vividly illustrated by the case of Anne
Hutchinson, which set a tone that persists to this day in
American constitutionalism.
IV. A CASE STUDY: THE ANTINOMIAN CONTROVERSY AND THE
ROLE OF LAW
The Puritan balance among individual, church, and state
was severely tested in the Antinomian Controversy of 1636-1638.
The crisis and its resolution was a seminal moment in the history
of New England; one that would both expose and define a vision
of the role of law that continues to permeate American life.
The controversy in brief can best be understood as revolving
around two figures: John Cotton, the most prominent New
England minister of his day and Anne Hutchinson, the wife of a
Boston merchant. Cotton had been Hutchinson's favorite
minister in England before the migration, and when he left for
Massachusetts in 1633, she and her family followed in 1634.200
Once settled in Boston, Hutchinson began to hold meetings in her
house with other laypersons, in which they would discuss the
sermons that they had heard that week in church.2 01 This was a
common practice, but it soon came out that Hutchinson was
questioning the spiritual authority of the New England
'a STEPHEN FOSTER, THE LONG ARGUMENT: ENGLISH PURITANISM AND THE
SHAPING OF NEW ENGLAND CULTURE, 1570-1700, at 288 (1991).
200 The ANTINOMIAN CONTROVERSY, 1636-1638: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 125, at 5. I have relied mainly on primary sources in this section of the
Article. For a recent account of Hutchinson's life and trial, see MICHAEL P. WINSHIP,
THE TIMES AND TRIALS OF ANNE HUTCHINSON: PURITANS DIVIDED (2005).
201 See WINSHIP, supra note 200, at 36, 144.
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ministry.20 2  She was said to believe that nearly all of them
except Cotton were preaching a covenant of works by allowing
sanctification to serve as evidence of justification. In other
words, by allowing right behavior to serve as an indication of the
indwelling of God's grace, the ministers were teaching that man
could in some sense earn salvation instead of receiving it by
God's free and unfettered dispensation.2 04
This was a direct affront to most of the ministry, which at
the same time became embroiled in a debate with Cotton about
exactly what it was that he was preaching. In October 1636, a
number of Massachusetts ministers held a private meeting with
Cotton, minister John Wheelwright-Hutchinson's brother-in-
law-and Hutchinson herself, after which Winthrop reported that
Cotton "gave satisfaction to them, so as he agreed with them all
in the point of sanctification, and so did Mr. Wheelwright; so as
they all did hold, that sanctification did help to evidence
justification."2 0 5 This consensus proved short-lived, however, for
in December 1636 the "rest of the ministers" of New England,
"taking offence at some doctrines delivered by Mr. Cotton,"206
drew up a list of sixteen questions for Cotton to answer, among
which the thirteenth one struck at the heart of the growing
controversy: "Whether evidencing Justification by Sanctification,
be a building my Justification on my Sanctification: or a going on
in a Covenant of Workes."2 07 Cotton answered the ministers'
queries-dryly referring to them as "Interrogatories"208-but his
lengthy response largely failed to satisfy his interlocutors on the
critical thirteenth question. In their Reply to Cotton's answers,
the ministers reasserted their belief that sanctification could
evidence justification, and they identified what they saw as the
danger of Cotton's views:
All [the recent controversies] have been ... taken up [by you] in
this one conclusion. That we can see neither Sanctification nor
202 See id. at 144-45.
203 See id. at 16, 34, 59, 72, 102.
204 See id. at 14-15, 59.
205 THE JOURNAL OF JOHN WINTHROP: 1630-1649, at 106 (Richard S. Dunn et al.
eds., 1996).
206 Id. at 113.
207 JOHN COTTON, SIXTEENE QUESTIONS OF SERIOUS AND NECESSARY
CONSEQUENCE (1637), reprinted in The ANTINOMIAN CONTROVERSY, 1636-1638: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 125, at 43, 52.
208 Id. at 46.
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faith no nor Justification, before the witness of the Spirit; but
all at once by it. And whereas it hath been wont to be argued
thus, He that believeth shall be saved, He that is justified shall
be saved, He that is sanctified shall be saved. Now it is thus,
He that shall be saved is justified is sanctified hath faith. viz.
He first seeth his good Estate in Gods thoughts of peace, (or in
Election) testified to him, and therein reads himself a believer,
justified, sanctified; and this is the only way, all others going on
in or aside to a Covenant of Works. Which if they be the truths
of God we would gladly be convinced thereof by sound proof.209
Cotton, in the ministers' view, had departed from the traditional
Puritan model of salvation, in which the believer "worked out"
his salvation by a process of preparation, faith, and self-
examination.2 1 0 Instead, he had endorsed a vision of salvation as
a direct instantaneous process, bringing faith, justification, and
sanctification together "all at once" in a flash of grace from
God. 2 1 1 This meant that Cotton-and by extension the
Antinomians, who preferred his ministry to others'-viewed the
traditional tokens of human effort as hallmarks of the covenant
of works and thus rejected the conventional teachings of the day.
This was also an implicit rejection of the ministry, whose job it
was to lead believers through this process by mediating the Word
of God to them.
While Cotton was continuing his debate with the ministers,
factions were forming on either side of the dispute in the Boston
church, as well as within the General Court,2 12 pitting the pro-
Antinomian governor-Henry Vane-against the more orthodox
members of that body. Vane tendered his resignation, then
withdrew it at the request of some of the Boston church
members, and a public fast was called for January 19 to try to
209 THE ELDERS REPLY (1637), in THE ANTINOMIAN CONTROVERSY, 1636-1638: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 125, at 60, 75.
210 See BREMER, supra note 130, at 66.
211 Winthrop disapprovingly noted that "the ground of all [spiritual knowledge,
in the view of the Antinomians] was found to be assurance by immediate revelation."
THE JOURNAL OF JOHN WINTHROP: 1630-1649, supra note 205, at 206. Hutchinson
would confirm these views at her eventual trial before the General Court, where she
claimed to know God's will by direct revelation. See The Examination of Mrs. Anne
Hutchinson at the Court at Newtown (Nov. 1637), reprinted in THE ANTINOMIAN
CONTROVERSY, 1636-1638: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 125, at 311, 337.
212 The General Court was the supreme civil authority in Massachusetts. See
BREMER, supra note 130, at 61-62.
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calm tempers.2 13 On that day, however, John Wheelwright
fanned the flames by delivering a sermon in the Boston church
trumpeting the Antinomian position.2 14 As a hostile Winthrop
recounted, Wheelwright "inveighed against all that walked in a
covenant of works, as he described it (to be), viz., such as
maintain sanctification as an evidence of justification, etc., and
called them antichrists, and stirred up the people against them
with much bitterness and vehemency. "215 In March 1637, the
General Court convicted Wheelwright of sedition for the
sermon. 216 Two months later, on May 17, 1637, Governor Vane
was voted out of office in a bitterly partisan election and replaced
with Winthrop.1 Tensions continued to boil, and in November
1637 the General Court, now under Winthrop's leadership,
disenfranchised and banished a number of the more prominent
Antinomians after they petitioned to the court to reverse the
judgment against Wheelwright.21 8 Lesser members of the faction
were allowed to stay, but they were forbidden to bear arms-a
rather stiff penalty considering the ongoing threat of Native
American attacks.21 9
The court then turned its attention to Hutchinson herself,
who was tried over two days in November 1637.220 The gravamen
of the case was that Hutchinson "hath traduced the magistrates
and ministers of this jurisdiction, that she hath said the
ministers preached a covenant of works and Mr. Cotton a
covenant of grace, and that they were not able ministers of the
213 See THE ANTINOMIAN CONTROVERSY, 1636-1638: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 125, at 7.
214 See John Wheelwright, A Fast-Day Sermon (Jan. 19, 1637), reprinted in THE
ANTINOMIAN CONTROVERSY, 1636-1638: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 125,
at 152, 161-62.
215 THE JOURNAL OF JOHN WINTHROP: 1630-1649, supra note 205, at 117.
216 THE ANTINOMIAN CONTROVERSY, 1636-1638: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 125, at 8.
217 See id. at 8-9.
21 See id. at 10; THE JOURNAL OF JOHN WINTHROP: 1630-1649, supra note 205,
at 131-33. A copy of the petition is reprinted in Winthrop's published account of the
crisis. See John Winthrop, A Short Story of the Rise, Reign & Ruine of the
Antinomians, Familists & Libertines (1644), reprinted in THE ANTINOMIAN
CONTROVERSY, 1636-1638: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 125, at 199, 248-
50.
219 See THE ANTINOMIAN CONTROVERSY, 1636-1638: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 125, at 10; THE JOURNAL OF JOHN WINTHROP: 1630-1649, supra note
205, at 133.
220 See generally The Examination of Mrs. Anne Hutchinson at the Court at
Newtown, supra note 211.
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gospel."22 ' Hutchinson denied this charge; the most she would
admit was saying that certain ministers preached the covenant of
grace more clearly than others:
Mrs. H[utchinson]: I pray, Sir, prove it that I said they
preached nothing but a covenant of works.
Dep[uty] Gov[ernor] [Thomas Dudley]: Nothing but a covenant
of works. Why a Jesuit may preach truth sometimes.
Mrs. H.: Did I ever say they preached a covenant of works
then?
Dep. Gov.: If they do not preach a covenant of grace clearly,
then they preach a covenant of works.
Mrs. H. No, Sir. One may preach a covenant of grace more
clearly than another, so I said.
Dep. Gov. I will make it plain that you did say that the
ministers did preach a covenant of works.
Mrs. H. deny that.222
Cotton bolstered Hutchinson's defense by testifying that
during their October 1636 conference with the elders, Hutchinson
had said that they "preach of the seal of the spirit upon a work
and [Cotton] upon free grace without a work or without respect to
a work, he preaches the seal of the spirit upon free grace and you
upon a work."22 3 Cotton added, "I must say that I did not find her
saying they were under a covenant of works, nor that she said
they did preach a covenant of works."224 To a sympathetic
audience, these distinctions would have meant that Hutchinson
was remarking on the connection drawn by ministers between
man's works and free grace-that is, their willingness to take
sanctification as evidence of justification-and contrasting it with
Cotton's preaching, which held that grace could be had free from
any taint of works. Cotton, on this comparison, might be seen as
preaching a less confusing version of the covenant of grace than
the other ministers. While this might be drawing the line very
thin, it was a position that could have been taken without
necessarily imputing to the other ministers a covenant of works.
But for the most part, the General Court was anything but
221 Id. at 330 (statement of Governor Winthrop).
222 Id. at 318.
223 Id. at 334.
224 Id.
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sympathetic; meanwhile, six ministers came forth to testify
against Hutchinson that she had accused them of preaching a
covenant of works or had otherwise disparaged the clergy.2 25
Hutchinson's second line of defense was that whatever she
did say was said in private, as a matter of conscience and not in
public to foment civil unrest. She said to the court: "If one shall
come unto me in private, and desire me seriously to tell them
what I thought of such an one, I must either speak false or true
in my answer. . . . It is one thing for me to come before a public
magistracy and there to speak what they would have me to speak
and another when a man comes to me in a way of friendship
privately there is difference in that."2 6
In the same vein, William Coddington, a member of the court
who made a belated effort to defend Hutchinson, urged that the
elders had breached the Word of God by making public things
that were "spoken but to a few and in private."2 27 Winthrop's
retort to these arguments was curt: "[Tihough things were
spoken in private yet now coming to us, we are to deal with them
as public."221 "What was spoken in the presence of many is not to
be made secret."22 9 The court clearly was determined to treat the
trial as a matter of public safety rather than one of private
belief.230
As the trial unfolded, however, Hutchinson's position
concerning the ministry proved to be only one facet of her more
troubling views of the entire process of salvation. Midway
225 Id. at 319-25.
226 Id. at 319.
227 Id. at 346. This was probably a reference to Matthew 18:15: "Moreover, if thy
brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and he
alone." See A Report of the Trial of Mrs. Anne Hutchinson Before the Church in
Boston (Mar. 1638), in THE ANTINOMIAN CONTROVERSY, 1636-1638: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 125, at 349, 349 n.2.
228 The Examination of Mrs. Anne Hutchinson at the Court at Newtown, supra
note 211, at 319.
229 Id. at 346.
230 This did not go unnoticed by contemporaries, many of whom-especially in
England-viewed the handling of the crisis as an indication that the New
Englanders were criminalizing matters of personal belief. When Winthrop's account
of the crisis was published in 1644, Thomas Weld, a New Englander then living in
London, felt compelled to add a preface protesting that the Antinomians had been
punished for encouraging civil strife, "not for their opinions, as themselves falsely
reported, and as our godly Magistrates have beene much traduced here in England."
John Winthrop, A Short Story of the Rise, Reign & Ruine of the Antinomians,
Familists & Libertines (1644), reprinted in THE ANTINOMIAN CONTROVERSY, 1636-
1638: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 125, at 199, 213.
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through the second day's proceedings, she began to defend herself
by relating "the ground of what I know to be true."2 3 1 She
explained that while she was suffering a spiritual crisis, God had
led her to passages in scripture that enabled her to "see which
was the clear ministry and which the wrong."2 32  Since that
experience, she declared: "I have been more choice and [God]
hath let me to distinguish between the voice of my beloved and
the voice of Moses, the voice of John Baptist and the voice of
antichrist.... Now if you do condemn me for speaking what in
my conscience I know to be truth I must commit myself unto the
Lord."233 What happened next sealed Hutchinson's fate:
Mr. Nowell. How do you know that that was the spirit?
Mrs. H. How did Abraham know that it was God that bid him
offer his son, being a breach of the sixth commandment?
Dep. Gov. By an immediate voice.
Mrs. H. So to me by an immediate revelation.
Dep. Gov. How! an immediate revelation.
Mrs. H. By the voice of his own spirit to my soul. ... Ever since
that time I have been confident of what he hath revealed unto
me.... [N]ow having seen him which is invisible I fear not
what man can do unto me.234
This claim provided just the opening that Governor
Winthrop felt he needed to dispose of Hutchinson once and for
all:
Gover. The case is altered and will not stand with us now, but I
see a marvellous providence of God to bring things to this pass
that they are. We have been hearkening about the trial of this
thing and now the mercy of God by a providence hath answered
our desires and made her to lay open her self and the ground of
all these disturbances to be by revelations ... .235
231 The Examination of Mrs. Anne Hutchinson at the Court at Newtown, supra
note 211, at 336.
2 Id.
233 Id. at 336-37.
234 Id. at 337-38.
235 Id. at 341. Hutchinson's claims of revelation may not have been wholly
unexpected. As we have seen, the clergy that had been querying Cotton had already
identified a belief in direct revelation as a corollary of the idea that justification
could not evidence sanctification. See WINTHROP, supra note 137, at 90-91 and
accompanying text. Winthrop, too, had noted in a journal entry the Antinomian
position that "the ground of all was found to be assurance by immediate revelation."
THE JOURNAL OF JOHN WINTHROP: 1630-1649, supra note 205, at 206.
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After a brief further discussion, Hutchinson was deemed "unfit
for our society" by the nearly unanimous vote of the Court.23 6
Winthrop swiftly pronounced the sentence: "Mrs. Hutchinson,
the sentence of the court you hear is that you are banished from
out of our jurisdiction as being a woman not fit for our society,
and are to be imprisoned till the court shall send you away. "237
While the religious disputes at the heart of this crisis may
seem abstruse to modern readers, the matter provides a vivid
example of the Puritan concept of the role of law. Part of the
significance of the controversy was its treatment of individual
conscience as a matter of legal concern. There was, to be sure, a
public aspect to what Hutchinson and her followers had wrought:
By the time of Hutchinson's trial, she and her supporters had
polarized both the Boston church and the General Court, which
led to a variety of major and minor disturbances in the life of the
colony. But it is hard to escape the feeling that Hutchinson
would have been punished even without the public unrest. An
exchange from the opening of the hearing reveals that there was
more to the trial than keeping the peace:
Mrs. H. What have I said or done?
Gov. Why for your doings, this you did harbour and
countenance those that are parties in this faction that you have
heard of. (Mrs. H.) That's matter of conscience, Sir.
Gov. Your conscience you must keep or it must be kept for
you. 238
236 The Examination of Mrs. Anne Hutchinson at the Court at Newtown, supra
note 211, at 347. The final vote was twenty-nine in favor, two dissenting and one
abstaining. See id. at 347-48; EMERY BATTIS, Appendix to SAINTS AND SECTARIES
345 (1962).
23. The Examination of Mrs. Anne Hutchinson at the Court at Newtown, supra
note 211, at 348. Hutchinson remained in Boston under house arrest for the rest of
the winter of 1637-1638. See A Report of the Trial of Mrs. Anne Hutchinson Before
the Church in Boston, supra note 227, at 349. In March 1638, she was tried again,
this time by the Boston church, which excommunicated her. See David D. Hall,
Introduction to THE ANTINOMIAN CONTROVERSY, 1636-1638: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 125, at 10. She left Massachusetts for Rhode Island six days
later, then moved to New York, where she was killed in a Native American attack in
1643. See id.
238 The Examination of Mrs. Anne Hutchinson at the Court at Newtown, supra
note 211, at 312.
2010]1 187
JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 49:143
From the very outset of the trial, then, it was clear that the
psychic state of the individual was seen as the appropriate
domain of the law-the "conscience" to be kept by the civil
powers.
But the trial involved more than correcting an errant
member of the flock. Hutchinson's beliefs also were the law's
concern because they threatened the carefully constructed
Puritan scheme of individual salvation and human authority. In
the opening statement of the trial, Winthrop accused Hutchinson
of having "spoken divers things as we have been informed very
prejudicial to the honour of the churches and ministers
thereof."2 39 But worse, Winthrop declaimed, she threatened the
very foundations of the Puritan Zion: "[T]he ground work of her
revelations is the immediate revelation of the spirit and not by
the ministry of the word, and that is the means by which she
hath very much abused the country that they shall look for
revelations and are not bound to the ministry of the word, but
God will teach them by immediate revelations and this hath been
the ground of all these tumults and troubles. . .. "24 In a sense,
Hutchinson's views were a logical development of Puritan
thought. If grace was experienced spiritually and internally, why
should the believer not get it directly from God? But such a view
would make unnecessary the painstaking process of "working
out" one's salvation in the prescribed manner. It would
marginalize the ministry, for no one would feel "bound" to its
guidance, and it would undermine the combined authorities of
church and state. Hutchinson had truly "abused the country" by
suggesting that the government did not need to exist as it did.
But too much was at stake for this to be allowed. Winthrop and
his cohort believed that the structures of church and state
existed to foster individual salvation and thereby to glorify God.
Failure meant not only damnation for individuals but God's
wrath on the entire colony. The New English Israel, that great
Puritan machine for the saving of souls, could not be jeopardized
by an errant conscience. Law would and must intervene to
preserve the approved system of salvation and the approved
social and political structures for bringing it about.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 341-42.
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V. THE PURITAN LEGACY IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The Puritan experience shaped America in many ways,
among them inculcating a fear of theocracy. From the distance of
history, the Puritan regime with its banishments, burnings, and
other punishments looks like a cautionary tale-a lesson that we
tend to congratulate ourselves for having learned in our
ostensible separation of church and state. Yet, in important
ways we now find ourselves repeating the pattern, making
religious use of law and surrendering spiritual authority to
government. Church and state may be formally separated, but in
achieving that separation we tend to overlook the functional
equivalence of the two.
Law now operates as a religion, addressing its commands to
the spiritual environment and taking as its task the creation of
the correct conditions for spiritual growth. The Court made this
explicit in the line of cases from West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette forward, in which the Court blended its
well-established powers of judicial review with an emerging
attention to internal states of being.24 ' Like the Puritan fathers,
the Supreme Court sees itself as a spiritual guardian, using law
to mediate its view of the necessary conditions for spiritual
flourishing. In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court was most overt about this role.
Drawing on the very language of Puritanism, the Court declared:
"Our Constitution is a covenant running from the first generation
of Americans to us and then to future generations."2 42 The
Supreme Court is the keeper of this covenant: "We accept our
responsibility not to retreat from interpreting the full meaning of
the covenant in light of all our precedents."24 3 This
"responsibility" includes not only policing the covenant against
state incursion but also defining the meaning of the covenant to
the American people who wish to live under the rule of law,
because "[tiheir belief in themselves as such a people is not
readily separable from their understanding of the Court invested
with the authority to decide their constitutional cases and speak
before all others for their constitutional ideals."24 4 To its subjects
who would be "tested by following," the Court pledged "to remain
241 See supra Part II.
242 Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 901 (1992).
243 Id.
2" Id. at 868.
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steadfast" in its "promise of constancy" as the keeper of the
constitutional compact.245 Like the Puritan ministers mediating
between man and God in the church covenant, the Supreme
Court mediates between its followers-the American people-and
the covenant of the Constitution. And, like the Puritan
authorities governing in the name of their model of salvation, the
Court governs in the name of its vision of what is best for the
human spirit.
That this has gone largely unremarked may be explainable
by the seeming benignity of the process. After all, the Supreme
Court does not hang or banish people as the Puritans did, and
the internal approach to law has tended to yield an apparent
expansion of individual rights-Gonzalez v. Carhart being the
rare exception.24 6 But in its own way, the Court is committed to a
spiritual orthodoxy and is as distrustful of the soul as the
Puritans ever were.
As we have seen, much of the Puritan church/state edifice
was erected for the sake of saving souls, based on the premise
that fallen man needed the guidance of authority to achieve
salvation. The individual, in short, was weak and needed the aid
of human authority to realize its divine ends. Many have seen
the Court's emphasis on individualism as liberal, but it can be
deeply illiberal as well. The Court's jurisprudence betrays a view
of the soul as unable to fend for itself and therefore, in need of
the ministrations of the Court. In case after case, from Barnette
to the endorsement test to Lee v. Weisman, Casey, and Lawrence
v. Texas, the Court has assumed that the individual soul is in
peril unless certain constitutional norms are enforced. 247 Thus,
the compelled recital of the Pledge of Allegiance becomes an
exercise in mind control. Being made to feel like an outsider is a
constitutionally cognizable wrong. A public prayer that might
make one debate whether to stand in respect or sit down in
protest is an "affront" and an "injury" to one's deepest being.
Having to wait for an abortion or to tell one's parents or spouse
beforehand may damage one's right to sort out one's metaphysics.
The prohibition of certain sexual behavior "demeans" people and
245 Id.
24 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159-60 (2007) (arguing that a
woman's spirit could be damaged if she procured an abortion only to learn later of
the distasteful method used by her doctor to terminate the pregnancy).
1 See supra Part II.
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constrains their "destiny." In none of these situations did the
Court allow itself to believe in the strength of the individual: that
a schoolchild could recite the Pledge without believing it; that a
middle-school student could respect the beliefs of others while
maintaining her own beliefs and accepting her difference from
the majority; that one could be regulated in one's ability to obtain
abortions without losing sight of one's "spiritual imperatives";
that a soul, free to believe anything it chooses under any state of
affairs addressed in these cases, could define itself and the
mysteries of life even in the face of opposing views and opposing
definitions. While the Court is concerned with the development
of the soul, unlike its nineteenth-century forbears, it does not
respect the soul enough to believe that it can stand on its own.
Human weakness means that the ministry of the Court is
needed to define the covenant, to speak "before all others"248 for
its content, and to create the correct social conditions for the soul
to flourish. It is true that from the founding, the judiciary has
been seen as a restraint on legislative excess and a protector of
minorities.24 9 But the Court has exceeded this function by going
beyond the discrete legal questions presented by concrete cases.
Instead, it has replicated the Puritan model by making itself the
architect of a particular spiritual status quo and using law to
defend it. The Puritans constructed an elaborate system of
church, state, and salvation because of their view of the essential
weakness of humanity. So, too, the Court will enforce its vision
of the right society to save us from our weaknesses because we
cannot be trusted to look out for ourselves. It is constitutional
law, not will, intellect, faith, nor independent thought that must
create the correct conditions for the soul's progress. Small
wonder, then, that one recent commentator could observe that
"the Constitution in some ways serves to generate mass
infantilization."25 0
The Court's distrust of the individual soul also leads it to
distrust the collective actions of individual souls-that is, to
distrust democracy. In the cases discussed above, the Court
struck down the actions of popularly elected legislatures and
2 Casey, 505 U.S. at 868.
249 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 390-91 (Alexander Hamilton) (McClean's ed.
2004).
250 Sanford Levinson, Our Papalist Supreme Court: Is Reformation Thinkable (or
Possible)?, in LAW AND THE SACRED 109, 110 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2007).
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state officials, acting in light of what was arguably prevailing
community sentiment. Might not such actions contain the
people's concepts of their own destinies-their collective views of
"existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life?"251 These laws were subject to normal democratic
procedures and could be changed any time those opposed to them
mustered the will or the support necessary to change them. If
the laws were wrong, that is, they could be fixed without judicial
intervention. Or, a possibility the Court did not allow, perhaps
some of the laws were right-perhaps the Constitution could be
read to permit them and perhaps the people and their delegates,
in passing them, were undertaking their own interpretation of
the Constitution and its covenant. The legal questions presented
were not self-answering, for in none of these cases-except
Brown-did all of the judges at every level of review agree on the
answer. Why is it not possible for the people or their delegates to
interpret the Constitution and for the Court to yield when the
issue is doubtful?
The answer is that the people are not the supreme authority,
or even a coequal one, even in a democratic republic. If the
individual is too weak to define himself apart from the state,
then collections of individuals only magnify that fatal flaw. That
is why the people's understanding of themselves "is not readily
separable from their understanding of the Court," and that is
why the Court must be the one to "speak before all others for
their constitutional ideals."25 2 That is why it is a heresy
deserving of the highest censure-judicial invalidation-for the
people to attempt to govern themselves and one another in ways
that do not square with the view of spiritual autonomy posited by
the Court. We cannot claim direct revelation of constitutional
principles because those principles must be mediated by the
ministry of the nine. Like Anne Hutchinson and her conscience,
we must keep the covenant or the Supreme Court must keep it
for us.
The irony of all of this is that a system designed to protect
the individual will, in the end, weakens the individual and his
aggregate democracy. If the soul is not allowed to stand on its
own, then it will lose the habit of doing so. The new covenant of
251 Casey, 505 U.S. at 980 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
252 Id. at 868 (majority opinion).
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the Constitution is seductive and insidious; it offers an appealing
freedom and an attractive vision of personal dignity while
making that freedom and that dignity dependent on the guiding
ministrations of a tribunal. We need not develop our own view of
constitutional principles because our Court will provide them for
us. In that process, however, we are called to sacrifice our
independence of mind and action, and we are told that our own
relationship to the meaning of the text is irrelevant and even
heretical. This is a covenant, but it is a covenant on the Court's
terms. Law is the tool of choice for the saving of souls, and it is
the Court, not we, who will decide how that spiritual goal will be
achieved.
The point here is not to decry any particular result. I do not
necessarily disagree with the social values expressed by the
Court's decisions, and had those values been expressed
democratically, instead of judicially, then this Article might not
have been written. But we are not ruled by ourselves in many of
the most important aspects of our national life. Instead, we are
ruled by a bevy of guardians who believe that they are the
hierophants of a mystical covenant of constitutionalism. The
Court's jurisprudence may be less systemic than Puritan
doctrine, but it is no less focused on using law to tend the spirits
of its flock. The American program has once again become the
saving of souls, and law is again called upon to administer a
particular system of spiritual belief. If we are to live in a
theocracy, then we should at least be sure that a theocracy is
what we want.
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